ABSTRACT The medical profession in many industrialized nations has increasingly been subjected to accountability measures, most notably through the development of quality assurance programmes for practitioners. In New Zealand this development has been enshrined in law under the Medical Practitioners Act 1995. This article looks at some of the concerns raised by these developments, particularly focusing on the ways this might affect practitioners using alternative therapies. From an examination of the debates around accountability in medical practice, and interviews with practitioners who use alternative therapy, three models of medical practice are proposed. These models suggest that medical practices reflect worldviews that revolve around the way relationships between the medical profession, the practitioner, the patient and the patient's condition are perceived.
Introduction
There has been a move by many industrialized nations to develop quality assurance programmes for medical practitioners and to attempt to develop more accountable medical systems (Coburn et al., 1997) . Recent health reforms and changes in medical legislation in New Zealand have taken on board these developments, and have led to debates over what forms of treatment are appropriate in medical practice. Arguments have been made that medical practice should be evidence-based and firmly embedded in science (Berg, 1997) . Such developments have the potential to narrow the focus of medical practice and restrict the autonomy of the medical practitioner. This is of particular importance to medical practitioners who may practice some form of therapy that does not conform to currently accepted conventions of medical practise, and whose treatment cannot easily be submitted to the gold standard of medical research -the randomized controlled trial (RCT).
In New Zealand the Medical Practitioners Act 1995 (MPA 1995) incorporated a number of changes from the previous legislation which gave the medical disciplinary and professional bodies more extensive powers. The Medical Council already had an array of powers at its disposal to control its membership, including the ability to fine, impose working restrictions, suspend or expel a practitioner. Since the passage of the MPA 1995, the Council gained the power to order an assessment of a practitioner, whether or not a complaint has been lodged against that practitioner, and also to implement or oversee quality assurance and competency programmes for its members. In the original draft of the Bill a clause from the previous legislation had been dropped. Clause 58/4 stated that: 'No person shall be guilty of disgraceful conduct in a professional respect merely because he has adopted and practised any theory of medicine or surgery, if in so doing he has acted honestly and in good faith' (Cole, 1985) .
Medical practitioners who practised some form of alternative therapy were prominent in articulating concerns over these new powers (Dew, 1997) . They expressed their concerns during submissions on the Act heard by a Select Committee in New Zealand's Parliament. These practitioners raised the possibility that encroachments upon their clinical autonomy could have the effect of forcing them to stop treating in ways that they felt were most appropriate. This debate raised issues over how medical practitioners can justify practising in a way that does not conform to their medical training. The 1993 Health Reforms introduced into New Zealand raised similar issues; in particular relating to the attempt to identify a set of core services that should be funded from the public purse.
The discussion that follows is based on debates about core services and the MPA 1995. The analysis is informed by research on debates over the use of alternative medicine carried in the letters pages of the New Zealand Medical Journal for a period of 30 years from 1965 to 1995, and observations and analysis of submissions to the Select Committee Hearings on the Medical Practitioners Bill. This material was supplemented by interviews with seven key informants identified from this process.
The explicit aim of the interviews was to explore how these practitioners justified using therapies they were not trained to use at medical school. This issue was raised at the Select Committee hearings by Parliamentarians, but not answered. Initial respondents were identified as practitioners who had participated in debates about the use of alternative therapies by medical practitioners, either in the pages of New Zealand medical journals or through submissions on the MPA 1995. Additional interviews were arranged by asking these respondents to identify other medical practitioners who used alternative therapies and who may be interested in talking about the issues covered. These were limited to practitioners who could be interviewed in the Wellington or Auckland region of New Zealand. Of those contacted, only one declined to be interviewed.
The respondents included a lecturer at a medical school who had
expressed concerns in the past about medical practitioners using alternative medicine. Another was an anthroposophical doctor who had opposed proposals in the original Medical Practitioners Bill 1995 that he saw as posing threats to medical practitioners who utilized unorthodox therapies. A medical practitioner who used electro-acupuncture, had been a past president of the New Zealand Medical Acupuncture Society, and had letters published in the New Zealand Medical Journal on the topic of the role of acupuncture in medical practice, was interviewed. Another respondent had also used a form of electro-acupuncture, had appeared before the Medical Council under disciplinary charges and had been removed from the medical register (see Dew, 1997) . His particular case had been raised by the Medical Council in submissions on the MPA 1995 to illustrate the sort of practitioner that they wanted excluded from medical practice. The other respondents practised a range of therapies including biopsychosocial medicine, herbal-based medicines, chelation therapy, dietary advice and the use of supplements. Interviews were of a semi-structured nature and lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. The interviews were based around a schedule of themes developed from the prior research. Respondents were asked to background their interest in alternative medicine, explain what form of authority they based their clinical practice on, explore how they responded to changes in the health services environment, and suggest how the medical profession should be policed to ensure it excluded unacceptable practices. This article explores how contradictions in medical practice are dealt with and how the medical profession has responded to calls for more accountability in practice. For the purposes of this article, particular examples are taken from debates over health reform, oral submissions made on the MPA 1995 and from the interviews, to highlight how practitioners attempt to resolve tensions in medical practice, and what the possible consequences of this are. In an attempt to clarify the issues raised in these debates and through the interviews, three models of medical practice are proposed. These are a scientific integrity model, a professional integrity model and an individual integrity model. It is suggested that each of these models attempts to resolve a set of tensions, but each model comes at a particular cost to the practitioner, the profession or the consumer of health services.
The interviews were transcribed, and themes were identified. The theoretical development moved from an initial attempt to explore justifications for practice and appropriateness of particular approaches (whether orthodox or unorthodox) to the way in which practices reflect a worldview. This worldview revolves around the way relationships between the medical profession, the practitioner, the patient and the patient's condition are perceived. From this a tentative model was developed, reflected upon and presented at a number of conferences. Initial assumptions in the model were identified through this process and the model was altered accordingly. All stages of the research fed into the way in which the models of medical practice were conceptualized. The analysis of the debates in the journals
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and before the Select Committee allowed for an initial outlining of the grounds for justification and the stakeholders in the health field appealed to, such as consumers, the tax-paying public and medical disciplinary bodies. The interviews permitted a deeper exploration of the process of justification, enabling the author to put forward counter-arguments drawn from the earlier analysis that tested the claims of the respondent. This process appeared to clarify the ideas and thinking of both the author and the respondent.
It is not suggested here that these models are exhaustive of all possible models of medical practice used by medical practitioners, but it is suggested that given an initial assumption of medical practice as altruistic, these are important frames within which medical practitioners operate.
Why the debates? The uncertainty of medical practice
At the heart of the issue of the acceptability of particular therapeutic practices is the question of what should medical practice be based upon. The ideal propounded by the medical profession is that scientific research is the basis of practice, and invalid therapies are untested. In addition to this a practitioner must be suitably trained at a reputable institution, and this training should be based on the most up-to-date scientific research (Bosk, 1986; Rosenthal, 1995) . Once trained the practitioner should keep up with developments in their field and mechanisms should be put in place to ensure this.
There are a number of problems that arise if this view is held. Much of what medical practitioners do has not been subjected to rigorous scientific scrutiny. This not only applies to alternative or unorthodox therapies, and issues of the uncertainty of medical practice, variability among practitioners and the untested basis of much of medical practice have been well documented.
In his analysis of uncertainty in medical practice Freidson (1975) found practitioners distinguished between 'normal' mistakes which anyone could make, and 'deviant' mistakes which were violations of accepted rules. Deviant mistakes, or 'glaring' mistakes, were identified as being due to ignorance, poor training or neglect due to poor attention. Normal mistakes derived from the uncertainty of medical knowledge and the limitation of available techniques, and for these mistakes one should not judge colleagues because 'there but for the grace of God go I'. Rosenthal (1995) echoes these findings in her studies of the 'incompetent' physician in Britain, where she distinguishes between avoidable and unavoidable mistakes.
A number of quantitative studies have been carried out which indicate the degree of uncertainty in medical practice. It has been found that in 29 percent of deaths there is a major disagreement between the death certificate and the autopsy on the underlying cause of death (Kircher et al., 1985) .
Health 5(1)
Improvements in diagnostic techniques have failed to lower the level of missed major diagnoses found in autopsies (Goldman et al., 1983) . In terms of inter-physician reliability Koran (1975) found that physicians almost always disagreed at least once in 10 cases, and often disagreed more than once in five cases. These disagreements occurred in the elicitation of physical signs, interpretation of diagnostic tests, making of diagnoses, recommendations for treatment and in evaluating the quality of care. In relation to these issues, and the uncertainties in medical practice, Eddy (1984: 75) states that: 'It is difficult for non-physicians, and for many physicians, to appreciate how complex these tasks are, how poorly we understand them, and how easy it is for honest people to come to different conclusions'.
Eddy goes on to suggest that due to this uncertainty:
the safest and most comfortable position is to do what others are doing. . . . A physician who follows the practices of his or her colleagues is safe from criticism, free from having to explain his or her actions, and defended by the concurrence of colleagues. (1984: 75) Eddy uses this idea of safety in numbers to explain the regional variations in clinical practice, suggesting that variation would be random if physicians did not act in this way. Daniels argues that one way in which ambiguity is reduced amid medical uncertainty is by the development of protocols, and that 'failure to follow the protocol is likely to be treated by superiors as a serious error in itself, regardless of patient outcome ' (1992: 121) . An editor of the British Medical Journal suggested that only about 15 percent of medical interventions are supported by 'solid scientific evidence' (Smith, 1991: 798) . Klein et al. argue that even where there is solid evidence there is still the problem of applying it to 'the specific circumstances of an individual patient ' (1996: 92) . Additional uncertainty is caused due to the fact that treatment with medicines always carries risk, and further, the value of a procedure also depends upon the skills and abilities of the person who performs it. Daniels claims that uncertainty in medicine is due to 'the application of a general and imperfect body of knowledge to individual clinical cases ' (1992: 119) . Klein et al. (1996: 93) conclude that the paradigm of scientific truth and certainty in medical practice is, if not largely fiction, at least an exaggeration.
Uncertainty is therefore inherent in medicine due to the variety of unique individuals to which medical knowledge (even if it may be certain in itself) is applied. This issue confronts consensus panels charged with the task of developing guidelines and protocols in treatment, and so it is not surprising that there is considerable disagreement on the appropriate medical treatment for common situations (Roos and Roos, 1994) .
In an effort to deal with the uncertainty of medical practice the medical profession has embraced evidence-based medicine (EBM), which promotes a hierarchy of authority. At the top of the scale is the RCT, with authority becoming increasingly weaker until the level where guidelines are based
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on the consensus of experts (Paterson, 1996) . In a Weberian sense this goes from an authority based on a narrow notion of rational science to a traditional authority. EBM has become increasingly important in the 1990s, although a landmark treatise was Archie Cochrane's 1972 text Effectiveness and efficacy (Lohr et al., 1998) . EBM developed in an effort to orient medicine more to what was perceived as the existing science and knowledge base. In its original conception EBM developed as a call for the integration of clinical expertise with clinical evidence -and the best research evidence was to be provided largely by RCTs.
A number of problems have been identified with basing clinical practice on EBM. Patients selected for RCTs tend to be middle-aged white males who have no co-existing conditions. In a clinical setting physicians are faced with a patient population that is far more diverse than this. Related to this, Lohr et al. (1998) note that the difference between efficacy and effectiveness impacts upon the clinical use of EBM. Efficacy 'requires that a clinical procedure achieves benefits to individuals in defined populations (often defined narrowly) when it is applied under ideal or optimal circumstances ' (1998: 8) . Effectiveness applies to the clinical setting where a procedure should do more harm than good. The meta-analytic approaches that are also used to gain insights from a number of different studies also have problems. For example they may not sufficiently overcome the clinical gaps in trial data. Moving down the scale of authority, Lohr et al. note that expert or consensus panels may have vested interests and other factors may come into play that unduly influence recommendations made.
We can note here a number of categories of therapy. The category most sought after is the very limited range of scientifically tested and orthodox practices, which may account for 15 percent of therapeutic practice. Another category, which probably accounts for most medical practice, is untested but orthodox practices. These practices are orthodox because they are accepted by a consensus. A third category is untested and unorthodox practices, ones that are mostly associated with alternative therapies. A final category is scientifically tested but unorthodox practices, perhaps recently tested treatments that have not yet affected established practices or challenged vested interests. It must be stressed that the way the term scientific is being used here is in the very narrowest sense of practices subjected to RCTs.
It should be noted that to divide medical practice into orthodox and unorthodox or alternative practices is a gross simplification of a very complex situation. The boundary between alternative medicine and orthodox medicine is not clear-cut, and what gets labelled 'alternative' at any particular time is dependent upon prevailing medical ideologies, cultural norms and the social organization and political power of the medical profession and other health practitioners. This is clearly illustrated in the case of chiropractic in New Zealand, where in the space of 12 years it went from being cast by the medical profession as an irrational and dangerous alternative therapy, to being accepted as part of orthodox medicine (Dew, 2000) .
Health 5(1)

The debates themselves
During the hearings on the MPA 1995 representatives of the medical profession had to justify their increase in powers and their ability to further control their membership. One way to do this was to argue that medical practice was based on the 'gold standard' of RCTs. But this strategy was not sustainable, as the parliamentarians on the Committee were well aware that much of medical practice could not be so justified. However, the more flexible concept of EBM could be used to give the profession an image of being based on a sound foundation.
This move to EBM can be seen as reinforcing elite groups within medicine. Although representatives of the medical profession may appeal to the need for greater public accountability to justify the development of EBM, this comes at the cost of consumer choice. This is exemplified in the debate over Clause 58/4 in the MPA 1995.
In a submission representing consumer interests, a chairperson of a community health group argued that the dropping of the clause allowing clinical freedom would force doctors to stop practising complementary therapies. The suggestion is that alternative medicine would not fit within the paradigm of EBM as much of what is practised is not amenable to RCTs and is unlikely to be accepted by a consensus of experts. If doctors were limited in this way then lay practitioners would fill the gap, and this would mean that the consumer would be deprived of a doctor's diagnostic skills. This assumes that lay practitioners are lacking these skills. Similar concerns were expressed over the development of quality assurance measures where practitioners would have to submit to peer review and medical audit. This was seen as a way of standardizing practices and eliminating those who offered alternative views (de Monchy, 1994) .
But it is not only practitioners of alternative medicine who may be affected by these developments. Since the 1950s there has been a movement within the medical profession towards biopsychosocial medicine. Armstrong has described this as an attempt by primary care physicians to redefine themselves in order to find a viable position within the medical marketplace. Armstrong argues that in this type of model 'the whole person is a multidimensional rather than a unitary being ' (1982: 119) . However, this extension of medical practice beyond the biological and physical into the psychological and social runs counter to the movement of EBM. It is as hard to scientifically test counselling, a part of the therapeutic regimen of the biopsychosocial practitioner, as it is to test homoeopathy.
Linked to these debates are the New Zealand Health reforms of 1993, which introduced the idea that a core of medical services should be subsidized from the public purse, and that in order to qualify these services must be shown to be effective and necessary (Cumming, 1997) . The debate about core services provides insights into possible strategies pursued by the medical profession to identify what is regarded as essential. An examination of the
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arguments of two practitioners, Alister Scott and David Perez, illustrates some of the conflicts among even orthodox members of the medical profession. Scott, then chairperson of the New Zealand Medical Association (NZMA), argued that the Government wanted to limit the assistance that will be available to patients 'to publicly-determined judgements of what is appropriate treatment ' (1993: 2) . He claimed that public funding of health services does need to be limited, and that this limitation should be based on a number of criteria. Services and treatments should be necessary to maintain social functioning to a reasonable degree, and should have been demonstrated to be effective. Scott suggests that doctors who believe in scientific medicine will have no difficulty with these principles: so long as it is science, not authority, that dictates the decisions, and so long as, when science cannot provide an immediate answer, there is a will to see that it does so eventually, by funding the investigations that are required. (1993: 3) However, as has already been suggested, such a position is a direct threat not only to the use of unorthodox medical practices, but also to most of what any doctor practises. Scott's appeal to fund scientific investigation so that answers will eventually be provided assumes a particular view of science, one where it is not contaminated by social events and is an impartial authority. This is highlighted when we consider who would determine public judgements of 'what is appropriate treatment' where there is in fact little scientific evidence to support orthodox treatments, or any other treatment. Whose 'authority' do we rely on? Historically it has been the medical profession itself that determines this for the 'public', based on what elites within that profession determine to be acceptable.
By contrast Perez, an oncologist, is dealing with a different set of principles. Perez (1993) considers the effect of the Core Health Services debate on cancer treatments, many of which have not been scientifically validated. He looks at the issue of who most appropriately assesses the value of treatment and the quality of life resulting from treatment. He quotes studies that suggest that the patient should define treatment benefit, although the general public should be involved in resource allocation issues. For Perez, Ministers should be heeding the advice of experts, while clinicians should also be listening to their patients.
In this we can see an inherent contradiction in orthodox medicine which comes to the fore when confronted by the types of economic constraints which the New Zealand Health Reforms attempt to institute. On the one hand the criterion of science is appealed to in order to justify why orthodox practitioners should maintain their status as being the only health professionals capable of devolving state health subsidies in personal (as opposed to public) care. On the other hand the wishes of the patient are appealed to when the orthodox medical profession is confronted with the fact that orthodox medicine has less than ideal scientific validation. A possible next step in the latter argument would be to allow individuals to Health 5(1) control their own resource allocation, and therefore undermine the medical profession's control. That is, the patient could attend whomever she or he pleases, as it is the patient who defines treatment benefit. Perez pre-empts this radical conclusion by appealing to some public control in the allocation of resources, as opposed to individual control. Public control would involve a special role for experts in the field -the orthodox medical practitioners.
The debate over a core of services and EBM links closely to the developments in quality assurance under the MPA 1995. Guidelines for quality assurance are related to guidelines for core services. EBM constitutes a major element in quality assurance and medical audit (Lohr et al., 1998) , and this is the position taken in New Zealand by the colleges overseeing the quality assurance process.
To summarize here, it can be suggested that the developments in priority setting, EBM and quality assurance all foster a tendency to the standardization of practices. In some ways this can be seen as a positive development. Studies in New Zealand indicated that there was no mechanism for dealing with huge variations in medical practice with widely varying outcomes (Bowie and Shirley, 1994) . However, one consequence of the standardization of medical practice as seen in the health reforms is that no mechanisms are provided to achieve patient choice (Howden-Chapman and Ashton, 1994: 77).
The debates around the validation of therapeutic practices fall across a number of fault lines. Should state-subsidized physicians have clinical freedom? Does EBM and quality assurance limit clinical autonomy, and if so, is that a good thing? Does variability in physician practice indicate a problem for the medical profession and the consumer of health services? In order to give some order to these tensions and stresses the following models of medical practice can be proposed.
Models of the medical profession
The following models link ideas of what a doctor is, what a patient is, what diseases are and what the profession should be. These models are in general agreement with those that were developed by Aakster (1986) , though the attempt here is to explicitly link medical cosmologies to practitioners' views of the medical profession.
These models are ideal-types in the Weberian sense (Giddens, 1971 : 141). They may not be discovered in this specific form in reality, but represent abstractions and recombinations of elements that lend a conceptual purity not necessarily found among individual medical practitioners. They offer insight into the relationship between medical cosmologies, the perceived role of the medical profession and standards of practice. Operating within one of these models resolves various tensions that occur in medical practice, particularly in general practice. These tensions include those between clinical autonomy and the integrity of the profession, the altruistic practice
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of medicine and the operation of general practice as a small business, the certainty of medical training and the uncertainty of clinical practice and so on (Dew, 1996) . They are all based on the notion that the ideal of medical practice must have, at its foundation, an altruistic stance. This is not to imply that medical practice necessarily fulfils this ideal, but medical practitioners are unlikely to claim otherwise.
Scientific integrity model
The scientific integrity model could also be described as a biomedical model, and Aakster describes it as a pharmaceutical model. Within this model the mind and body are seen as separate and the body is the main focus of medical attention. This tradition is informed by a mechanistic materialist philosophy, where the body is seen as a series of parts which can be treated separately, and where the whole consists of the sum of its parts (Laor and Agassi, 1990: xii) . Treatment is directed at getting those parts working again. Disease is a physical entity affecting a physical body, signifying either a malfunction of the part which must be substituted (e.g. insulin or surgery) or an infestation which must be removed.
Medical practice is ideally based on EBM. Treatment is based in a pharmaceutical framework where clinical trials can be developed without the fear of contamination from other variables. Surgical procedures for the mechanical restoration of function are also promoted -and in this instance, as RCTs are impossible, or at least the double-blind aspect of them, scientific assessment is less rigorous. Any other modality, from physiotherapy to counselling, is viewed with suspicion. The doctor is an elite technician who identifies malfunctions and puts them to rights, or passes the patient on to someone else who will also be working within this model. The profession remains open to those who adhere to the scientific model, are adequately trained and keep up with the required standards that are based on the external authority of science.
The medical consultation is not time-consuming as the organic lesion will be quickly identified or the patient will be sent on to someone else. There is no tension between the profession and the individual practitioner as what is good for one is good for the other. Lay practitioners may be seen as quacks that simply deceive a gullible public. Consumer demands for accountability must be met by demonstrating that medical practitioners base their approach on the latest scientific knowledge. Consumer choice would only relate to types of practitioners, not to choice of therapeutic approaches.
This model resolves many of the tensions and contradictions faced by the physician by ignoring them or seeing them as having little significance and medicine is seen as being unified in theory and practice. Uncertainty in medical practice is hardly acknowledged. For example, when it was suggested in an interview to the medical school lecturer that many studies had found that what orthodox doctors practised had not been well validated, he
Health 5(1) replied: 'I think that that is a myth that was created by Archie Cochrane. . . . Nobody has ever done a study in general practice, people just come up with these figures out of the air -they are guesswork'. He went on to dismiss the suggestion that there was a great deal of uncertainty in medical practice on the following grounds:
I was in general practice for 20 years and I think I always made a diagnosis. Now it might not have been a 100 percent certain diagnosis, it might not have been expressed in pathological terms, but there was always a name for what the person had and I suppose it depends on how you define the word diagnosis. To me a diagnosis is a name that the patient and me agree to put to what is wrong.
This respondent regarded western science as truth, and yet in clinical practice he argued that he reverted to a personal, or even constructed, view of science, with a diagnosis being an agreed-upon name. In this, clinical experience involves aspects of the art of medicine, a view that can be associated with the notion of indeterminate knowledge. Atkinson argues that:
the clinician who appeals to his personal knowledge does so not by reference to his uncertainty, nor the uncertainty of his colleagues. Rather, he bases his actions and decisions on what is taken as a bedrock -the certainty -of direct experience. (1997: 188) Whereas theories and systems change, personal knowledge can be a 'bedrock of certainty'. The reliance on personal experience may appear to be widely divergent from a reliance on RCTs, but the flexibility of medical discourse allows these extremes of view to be held by the same individual practitioner.
Professional integrity model
The second model is that of the profession of medicine as a normative community. It tends to have strong affiliations with those who practise biopsychosocial medicine, and Aakster terms it an integrational model. The position of the oncologist discussed earlier would broadly speaking fit into this model. There is the view here that science is limited and can be wrong. Standards cannot be based on science alone, especially as much of clinical practice does not have scientific verification. Standards are therefore based on consensus and an acceptance of norms, which is dependent upon the profession itself possessing integrity.
In this model a holistic metaphor of the body is used, where the body is conceptualized as a series of inter-related parts. The mind and body are not seen as opposites. Terms like 'biopsychosocial' highlight the inter-relatedness of the body, the mind and society. Disease develops often from a confluence of causes that may be found in the physical, psychological and social spheres. Treatment may be directed at one or all of these and may involve any number of modalities whose popularity may change over time. Treatment can involve modalities that have not been absolutely 'proven' in any sense (e.g. the use of counselling, listening skills, an interest in exploring the
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social issues that may play a part in disease). The model retains a normative status in treatment in that treatment is directed at restoring a person to fit back into society.
The practitioner is more than an elite technician, she or he is also a carer and a supporter. Those who reject their medical training and develop unorthodox methods of treatment are seen in a more complex way in this model. Non-conformists may be expelled from the profession, but this does not necessarily mean that they are wrong, they may be ahead of their time or have insights others do not have. As one respondent said:
Well I think . . . that someone [who] goes out on a limb is heavily penalized, and they are often visionaries aren't they. Often they are not; they're just bad. But often they are someone, a visionary who has got an idea that there is a better way to do it, and they are punished for it. . . . And most people who challenge ideas will either be looked on as heroes and given lots of awards, or they will be dumped and discredited and suffer professionally, and sometimes personally as well.
The profession needs to be policed, and sometimes in that policing mistakes will be made. This is the price that is paid for regulation and an overriding need to protect the public. In the words of the same respondent 'the profession has to maintain some consistency and some credibility and people need to feel that [wherever] they see a doctor . . . they will get a common body of knowledge and tools brought to that problem'.
However, within this model practitioners should be allowed to practise anything as long as they first stick to the norms, which revolve around first of all doing what all other doctors do, in particular, using diagnostic skills to eliminate the possibility of serious disease. The profession should be open to those who adhere to the consensus, are adequately trained and keep up with the required standards which are based not only on the external authority of science but also on the external authority of norms. Those who do not accept the consensus, even if they provide an effective service, would rightfully face the possibility of being expelled from the profession.
The consumer has a more developed role to play here in that the practitioner attends to issues raised by the consumer, and searches for causes of disease beyond the physical. Consumer desire for a more caring and less hierarchical approach may be taken seriously (Coyle, 1999) .
This position is fraught with tension. For example, one respondent argued EBM and accountability would dominate the health field, but 'science doesn't have all the answers either . . . there are an increasing number of people who go to doctors for answers to the problem of living and are not getting them'.
She used an example from her own experience where a patient's stomach ache went away after she had laid her hands on the person.
realize that as people feel comforted, and they feel validated, that certain physiological things, hormonal things, happen in their body that reduces inflammation and facilitates healing and helps oxygen transport . . . it is not a big deal that we don't understand.
There is hope here that science will eventually give answers to questions about how alternative therapies work. This is the 'truth will out device' noted in the discourse of some scientists by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984: 109) . On the other hand a position is taken that it is not important to understand the mechanisms anyway, as long as they work. This latter position is not based upon scientific validation, but on the practitioner's own understanding of what 'works'. There are shifts between authority based on her own clinical experience, authority based on some external criteria or standard and authority based on consensus. As with the scientific integrity model, the bedrock of experience can be relied upon to justify the individual's practice.
It can be argued that this model attempts to resolve contradictions in medical practice by acknowledging the limitations of science in clinical practice. The consequence of this is to make problematic the whole notion of standards, and this in fact is not resolved in this model, as it is admitted that current standards may themselves be inappropriate.
Personal integrity model
In this model there is the view that science does not have all the answers, and that science is limited and can be wrong. However, standards cannot be based on consensus, as the professional community may be wrong. Standards are therefore based on the basic training and the integrity of the individual. This model explicitly acknowledges that practice is based in experience, whereas the other two models hold this implicit.
This model also uses a holistic metaphor of the body, however a spiritual element may be highlighted, possibly karmic influences or the inheritance of miasmas from ancestors, therefore going beyond a biopsychosocial model. Disease develops often from a confluence of causes, which may be found in the physical, psychological, social and spiritual spheres. Treatment may then be directed at one or all of these. Treatment is up to the individual practitioner, but is based in some body of theory. It can involve modalities that have not been 'proven' in a narrow scientific sense, for example the use of homoeopathic potencies. Treatment may be directed at a perceived spiritual dimension, or an unconscious dimension. Aakster argues that 'this is a time-dimension, it relates the human being to its past and future, it emphasises the goal-striving behaviour, the realization of the self over time ' (1986: 269) .
The model rejects a normative status in treatment in that treatment is directed at enabling patients to follow their own paths and fulfil their human potential. The doctor is a guide, who helps patients on their life path, as well as being a carer, a supporter and a technician. It is not so much what
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people do that would exclude them from the profession, but how they do it. Signs of a person lacking integrity, and therefore warranting expulsion, include taking excessive money for their treatment or seeing too many patients. In fact, due to the altruistic ethos of medicine, all models would reject the unscrupulous practitioner. However, the reasons for this rejection may differ here. One respondent stated that:
If . . . there is a lot of money being made out of it, then I don't trust it. Because medicine as I see it . . . is a priestly task. Why do I choose medicine? To teach me humility and to help the [patient] come further in his or her biography.
The profession is open to those who have been adequately trained, and beyond that, individual doctors may pursue their own paths, which may challenge the standards of their colleagues.
Pursuing a personal integrity model does not mean the rejection of orthodox scientific approaches. Informants spoke of a 'discomfort' or 'frustration' with the limitations of their clinical practice that led them to explore other avenues. This is supported by research where it was found that feelings of 'clinical powerlessness . . . [led some general practitioners] to take an interest in problem-solving strategies from outside the domain of the clinical and scientific paradigm' (Lynöe and Svensson, 1992: 59) . Informants valued their original medical training and did not discard it once they became interested in alternative approaches to healing. This tempers the view that medical practitioners become interested in alternative medicine due to a narrow definition of benefits based around financial interest in lucrative markets. In fact, an interest in alternative medicine meant a loss of financial benefit for many as their consultation times with patients were lengthier and so they saw fewer people than their orthodox colleagues.
The notion of science employed by this group maybe broader than that employed under the scientific integrity model. A respondent who used electro-acupuncture illustrates this:
The scientific method involves basically observation, interpretation of the observations and putting the theory to these observations. Now we do that regardless of whether you have got lab tests, double-blind studies and all that other sort of stuff. . . . The whole system of Chinese medicine is very scientific in that true sense, of observations, interpretations and so on.
More distant from an orthodox model were those that claimed to practise an alternative science. The anthroposophical doctor referred to anthroposophy as spiritual science. He stated that:
it is actually very scientific -it is at least as scientific as the rest of science. And you enlarge science to encompass things . . . not directly visible with your five senses [and] you can use the same rigour of scientific investigation in those fields. And then you find the same reproducible results.
This respondent suggested that medicine itself was not a science. This related to his views that science deals with categories, and medicine deals Health 5(1) with individuals; science with uniformity, medicine with difference; science with the object, medicine with the subject. This is perhaps the crucial point in identifying the different worldviews here. This is not a rejection of science, but a very tight boundary is placed around what science can say. Medicine draws on science, but is not a science because it deals with unique individuals.
Policing of the profession is a very thorny issue from this position. If the categories of scientific analysis are appropriate for medical practice, then one could police successfully. But if medical practice dealt with unique individuals beyond categorization, then the policing role is minimized to those issues around crossing moral boundaries, not clinical ones. The consumer here does not only have rights to choice, but becomes more responsible for their own choices. It is up to the consumers to decide what approach they want, and if they are unhappy they have the right to move on. Consumers must judge the integrity of the individual practitioner, and the state, or its representatives, could play little part in the protection of consumers.
This model attempts to resolve contradictions in general practice by acknowledging the limitations of science, and the limitations of humanity. In doing so, standards become very difficult to define, and ultimately the responsibility for standards of care lies not with the profession, but with the individual practitioner and his or her patients.
Discussion
These models are attempts to resolve contradictions and tensions in general practice; yet each model brings with it its own sets of problems. In the first model there is an unrealistic view of the role played by science in a medical practitioner's clinical practice. In the second model there appears to be difficulty in justifying changes in norms -how they arise and how they develop. In the third model there is a major conflict between the practitioner and the profession. The current health reforms in New Zealand often use the rhetoric of the first model, seen in the concept of a core of health services, the development of EBM and the ideals of quality assurance. However, the way the profession functions tends to accord with the second model, seen in the increasing power given to the Medical Council and the development of peer reviews and consensus conferences in determining appropriate medical practice. Finally, these changes would appear to jeopardize the position of those who adhere to the third model, who may increasingly be subjected to the norms of the medical community, and have their clinical freedom restricted or even curtailed.
From this discussion it can be seen how science is a flexible concept when related to clinical practice. This flexibility allows for the policing authorities in medicine to maintain some boundaries in medical practice, while at the same time allowing 'business as usual'. Very rigid and contracted views of science can be used to undermine the positions of those
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who hold unorthodox views. The consistent application of scientific criteria would also undermine the position of most medical practice, and so an expanded view of science can be used to avoid this problem. Medical authorities are able to move between these views according to the context. A view of medical science based on RCTs allows for a stringent policing of practice by the collective. It reinforces the legitimacy and integrity of the profession. An expanded view of science allows for freedom of practice, but also moves medicine into more of a 'market' situation where the buyer must beware. In order for the medical profession to say to the public that 'you can trust us' there is a movement to standardize, ostensibly based on rigid science. This is in tension with the actual uncertainties of medical practice.
This analysis of the way in which science is utilized in different ways according to the particular context supports Silverman's appeal to 'recognise that the phenomenon always escapes' (Silverman, 1993: 201) . This undermines the search for a stable reality called 'science' and alerts us to the work that such invocations of science do. In any particular context we must reassess what it is that is being invoked when the term science is used, and remain aware that any particular individual may invoke science in different ways according to the issue being faced. When science is related to medicine the analysis is further complicated. The authority of the medical profession is the rigour of its science, but clinical practice is not scientific in that ideal rigorous sense. Given this, authority may be based on the clinical experience of the practitioner, their training or something that is seen as working, even if it cannot be explained. This fluidity of argument by practitioners, though appearing unstable, gives strength to their position. Opposing this fluidity are current trends in new managerialism which demand quantifiable accountability to stabilize and standardize clinical practice. This neo-liberal response to the powers of the medical profession proposes 'surrogate' variables that will stand measure for otherwise abstract ideas of health (Osborne, 1997) . The strictures and limitations of EBM and RCTs threaten the continuance of flexibility and autonomy in clinical medicine.
In addition, this study alerts us to the tensions that occur within the medical profession and the ways that these relate to quite different formulations of how relationships between the patient, the complaint, the practitioner, the profession and the state can be organized. This situation tempers any straightforward analysis of challenges to medicine by highlighting the conflicts within medicine itself, questioning the notion of the medical profession as a uniform agent. It raises the question of what 'medicine' is being challenged (Gabe et al., 1994) .
Finally, this analysis questions the view that complementary medicine and orthodox medicine are becoming less incommensurable by signalling that the very notions of complementarity, alternative and orthodox are equally open to flexible usage (Willis, 1994) . Just as one must examine what Health 5 (1) is being invoked when the term science is utilized, one must examine what is being invoked when complementarity is utilized. The changing definitions of these terms can be seen as indicators of political struggles and must not be taken at face value. The developments of quality assurance and other mechanisms to 'standardize' practices may create 'orthodoxy' even where we see practitioners using such titles as complementary and alternative in their self-descriptions. It can be suggested that 'rational' assessment and quality assurance practices pose a real threat to the existence of 'alternative' worldviews in medical and healing practices. Commensurability may be more a sign of this change than a sign of medical practice being able to encompass other worldviews and philosophical positions.
